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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the economic 
rationale behind an unusual field study 
finding with the help of agency theory. 
Why would a firm evaluate employees on 
one measure but reward them on the 
basis of another conflicting measure? The 
paper adopts Yin’s (1994) scientific case 
study approach to identify practical 
reasons from a division of a single firm.  
 
The analysis points to the firm’s inevitable 
need to control two potential opportunism 
sources namely, information-hiding and 
delaying (or ‘go-slow’) as the primary 
reasons for the deliberate design of such 
mismatching measures. Finally, the firm 
exploits the economic power of the 
customer satisfaction measure, whose 
subjectivity and informal design helps 
offset the negative effects of the goal 
conflict.  
 
While the extant literature identifies two 
types of measurement mismatch, this 
paper documents the prevalence and 
management of a third type namely, 
deliberate design of mismatching 
measures for conflicting goals. 
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Introduction 
 
While doing a pilot study on product 
customisation in Skope Industries Limited, a 
leading New Zealand-based producer of 
commercial refrigerators, we noticed that the 
firm has two separate product-line divisions 
based on the source of customisation, with 
different performance management systems 
for each division. The first division designs 
and produces firm-specified products, a 
context in which the firm offers a range of 
existing customised models and options.  To 
make any firm-specific product, employees 
have full access to the product specifications 
and process knowledge from the firm’s 
documentation.  The second division 
manufactures customer-specified products, for 
which the firm first assesses the technical 
feasibility upon receiving a customer order 
before proceeding to develop a specialised 
design for each order.  While the pre-existing 
product and process knowledge enables easier 
programming of operational tasks in the first 
division, the absence of any pre-existing 
documentation in the second division makes 
task planning less programmable and more 
complex.  
 
In examining the detailed features of the 
performance management systems, we 
observed that within the customer-specified 
division, the measures used to evaluate 
workers’ performance are distinctly different 
to the measures used for reward purposes. 
While the operations manager uses adherence 
to new customer order specifications 
(ADSPEC) and lead time in delivering the 
order (DETIME) as measures for evaluation, 
he uses number of new projects (NUMPRO) as 
the measure for rewards. Finally, though 
Skope adopts two subjective indices, (1) 
commitment and aptitude for assuming 
challenges, (2) customer satisfaction, they are 
not included as formal measures: neither for 
evaluation nor for reward purposes. While 
commitment is emphasised in manager-worker 
discussions during the selection and retention 
process (with information obtained through 
peer-worker feedback and by overall 
performance appraisal by the human resources 
(HR) division, as explained in a later Section ), 
customer satisfaction data is obtained through 
a register wherein customers, if they wish, can 
record their feedback.   
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The observed mismatch between the measures 
used in performance evaluation and incentive 
compensation seems unusual for two reasons. 
First, in line with the common knowledge 
management adage, “what gets measured gets 
noticed but what gets rewarded finally gets 
done”, these measures may lead to divergent 
goals. While workers may be keen on 
procuring new projects so as to increase their 
own utility, the manager may also be keen on 
achieving ADSPEC and DETIME for the 
existing projects. Second, the observed 
mismatch is different to the two mismatching 
measurement types already documented in the 
existing performance management literature 
namely, 1) different weights and 2) selective 
focus (Baiman, 1990; Brickley, Smith and 
Zimmerman, 2008; Holmstrom, 1989; Ittner, 
Larcker and Rajan, 1997).  
 
In the first type, though the same set of 
measures are set for both evaluation and 
reward purposes, specific weights are assigned 
to the measures in determining the rewards. 
The use of weights in this performance 
measurement type allows managers to 
implicitly define a firm’s priorities and gain 
workers’ attention to address those priorities. 
In the second type, since only some measures 
are used for rewarding from a suite of 
measures identified for evaluation, the firm’s 
expectation is that performance will maximise 
in the selected measures but remain at the 
minimum threshold in relation to the other 
measures. However, unlike these two types, 
the observed measurement mismatch in this 
paper is likely to create goal divergence 
because of conflicting interests between 
managers and workers. Since this type of 
mismatch is not still documented, we believe 
that any evidence on how the divergence is 
managed in the real world will contribute to 
the existing literatures on performance 
management and knowledge management. 
Although this paper draws upon ‘product 
customisation’, it is merely used as a context 
to inform the two stated main literatures.   
 
While this paper’s focus is on Skope’s 
customer-specified division, reference is also 
made to the firm-specified division to 
triangulate evidence about the customer-
specified division.  While the measures used 
for evaluation in the customer-specified 
division differ from the measures used for 
rewards, the measures used in the firm-
specified division are identical for both 
evaluation and reward.  The presence of 
diverse practices in two divisions of the same 
firm lends support to the view that the 
observed mismatch in the customer-specified 
division is not just a random occurrence, but 
more a deliberate design of performance 
measurement. 
 
The aims of this paper are therefore two-fold: 
1) to understand the field study evidence as to 
why such mismatch exists and how the firm 
aligns the resultant divergence in the goals of 
managers and workers; and 2) to explain the 
case evidence in order to expand the 
theoretical horizon upon which future 
empirical research can be based (known as 
‘analytic generalisation’, see Yin, 1994, pp. 
35-40).  
 
Going beyond the firm’s cost-based 
justification for the mismatch in the design of 
measures between evaluation and reward, our 
analysis points to the firm’s necessity to 
control two potential opportunism sources 
namely, information-hiding and delaying (‘go-
slow’), that arise with product customisation-
led conflicting goals, as the reason for the 
mismatching design. These goals are to adhere 
to the initial specifications agreed with 
customers while at the same time encourage 
workers to identify value-adding innovation 
during the course of production, even if the 
innovations require the firm to violate the 
initially agreed specifications. What is the 
incentive for the worker team to reveal its 
knowledge on the project’s innovation 
potential, particularly when the team’s reward 
is based on achieving the ADSPEC and 
DETIME measures that are set initially? Even 
if the workers commit to do further innovation, 
what is the guarantee that they will not 
unnecessarily delay the project in the pretext 
of continuing innovation? Is there any 
significance in the use of informal subjective 
measures in mitigating the divergence due to 
the mismatching measures?  To find answers 
to these performance management questions, it 
is vital to examine and document what firms 
such as Skope do. 
 
The remainder of the paper is as follows.  The 
next section describes the unusual finding: the 
mismatching design of measures at Skope’s 
customer-specified division.  The paper then 
analyses the field study findings before setting 
out conclusions and study limitations.   
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Field Study Findings 
 
Company Background  
 
Skope employs over 400 people in its main 
Christchurch factory to design and 
manufacture commercial refrigerators and 
markets them across New Zealand, Australia 
and the Middle East.  The processes are briefly 
stated as follows. First, steel sheets are sheared 
and punched automatically by the flexible 
manufacturing system (FMS) that processes 
input data from the computer to determine the 
set-up, quality and quantity parameters. The 
punched sheets are folded into the semi-
automated press for the folding process. The 
sheets then pass through the paint line process 
and are then sent to the assembly section. The 
assembly section comprises a range of 
activities. The sheets are insulated with non-
polluting chemicals in a ‘foaming’ process. 
The doors and ducts are assembled to the 
sheets to make ‘skeleton’ refrigerators. The 
skeletons are then mounted with compressors. 
The refrigerators are finally examined in the 
testing station and forwarded to the packing 
station. In short, five main processes exist in 
Skope’s manufacturing operation: punching 
(FMS), folding, painting, foaming and 
assembly.   
 
Early in 2000, with increasing competition and 
the need to customise products beyond the 
firm-specified product range and options, 
Skope created an exclusive customer-specified 
division within the main factory where all of 
the five processes were carried out within the 
same division1.  Initially, ten key workers were 
identified and trained in several processes and 
assigned to this division. Over time, ten further 
employees were hand-picked for this division 
from both internal and market sources.   
 
Although it is a small unit within the main 
factory, this division is accorded a status 
worthy of a research and development unit 
because the new product models created in this 
division become the feeder for the factory’s 
list of firm-specified models.  The general 
manager recognises the main factory as one 
large firm-specified division consisting of five 
process departments.  
 
                                                          
1This structure is called the “factory-within-a-
factory” within the operations management 
literature (see Miltenburg, 2008). 
Reporting Structures 
 
Three general managers (human resources, 
finance and plant) assist the managing director 
who is also in charge of Skope’s marketing 
function. Several middle-level managers report 
directly to the three general managers.  The 
managers of design, computing services, 
maintenance, manufacturing, and technical 
development report to the plant general 
manager.  
 
The manufacturing function is headed by an 
operations manager under whom more than 
160 (including casual) workers are employed 
in various manufacturing processes. First, both 
divisions are overseen by the same operations 
manager.  However, as the firm-specified 
division is too large for efficient span of 
control, a process leader is appointed for each 
process department to collect and provide 
output information to the operations manager.   
 
Further, a group of these processes are 
managed by a team leader. For instance, the 
paint line, FMS, steel store and folding process 
are coordinated by one team leader.  The team 
leader reports directly to the operations 
manager while a process leader reports to both 
the team leader and the operations manager. 
Though the customer-specified division carries 
out all the process functions in one place, the 
division’s functions are coordinated by one 
process leader, who reports directly to the 
operations manager.   
 
Three visits were made to the Skope’s factory 
in Christchurch.  The purpose of the first visit, 
was to gain an overview of the production 
process.  This was followed with the two 
further visits to conduct interviews, collect 
archival documentary evidence, and observe 
practices. Table 1 lists the interviews and 
Tables 2 and 3 list the archival documents and 
observations at Skope.   
 
Customer Order Processing 
 
Upon receiving a new order for a customised 
refrigerator, the plant general manager 
discusses with the operations manager and the 
process leader (who represents all workers) to 
determine if the customer-specified division is 
capable of manufacturing the order.  If the 
order is accepted, the details are forwarded to 
the division workers, who identify a list of 
manufacturing tasks relating to the order. The 
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process leader forwards the task list to the 
operations manager and discusses each line 
item in the list with the operations manager 
before executing the tasks along with his 
fellow workers.  
 
Table 1: Interviews Conducted 
 
The process leader admits that he constantly 
faces uncertainty in carrying out the tasks for 
each new order, which in turn, makes the 
division workers highly dependent on one 
another.  The process leader admits: 
 
 “If someone gives us a job, we never think 
that it is too hard … The more the challenges 
that we get chucked in, the more closely we 
work (to resolve).” 
 
This is in direct contrast to the practice in the 
firm-specified division where the knowledge 
relating to technical and financial details of 
different product models are published in a 
brochure called the Cool Book. This 
knowledge enables potential customers to 
assess the functionalities of different options 
and choose their desired requirements.  
 
The financial details in the Cool Book provide 
information on prices, based on cost-plus 
method. The firm-specified division thus 
clarifies all available model and option details 
prior to entering into contract with its 
customers.    As the knowledge is already 
assembled for later use by the transacting 
parties, the production or task-related 
uncertainty is lower in firm-specified division.   
 
This is confirmed by the operations manager 
as under: 
 
“In a firm-specified product, there is a design 
before it (an order) is accepted … my first 
consideration is down to (knowing) what is 
actually required, what the product is 
designed to do and what functionality… 
because we are operating a number of 
different cells (processes), I oversee (the 
workers’ tasks) to ensure that the tasks do not  
adversely affect another process.” 
 
Comparing the order processing activities in 
the two divisions, we find differences in terms 
of documentation, and planning timeline.  
While the Cool Book dictates all technical and 
cost details of each firm-specified order, there 
is no pre-existing documented knowledge 
equivalent of Cool Book for a customer-
specified order.  
 
While the activities for firm-specified orders 
begin ex ante (before getting customer orders), 
interview evidence suggests that most of the 
activities in the customer-specified division 
are planned ex post (after receiving customer 
orders).  
 
Our observations also suggest that the 
customer-specified division, unlike its 
counterpart division, undertakes all activities 
in its own division including design, 
manufacturing and assembly, though it 
interacts with other process departments to 
resolve any technical snags.  
 
Measures for Evaluation and Incentive 
Compensation 
  
The operations manager uses ‘job plans’ to 
derive benchmark measures in evaluating the 
overall performance of the customer-specified 
division. The job plans list the resources 
required for a job, the expected unit costs for 
each resource and the total job costs. The 
operations manager uses measures from the 
job plan such as ADSPEC and DETIME for 
each job to evaluate the overall performance of 
the division.  
  
 
Interviewees Duration (minutes) 
1. Chief Executive Officer 90 
2. Plant General Manager 90 
  60 
  30 
3. Operations Manager 120 
  30 
4. Maintenance Manager 30 
5. Process Leader (worker) 60 
  60 
6. Design Manager 60 
7. Presiding Officer- HR 60 
8. Human Resources Advisor 30 
9. Presiding Officer-Finance 60 
  60 
10. Purchase Manager 75 
 Total interview time 915 
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Table 2: Archival Documents Analysed 
 
 Document Source 
  1. Position Description: Process Leader (worker) Skope Custom  
  2. Position Description: Team leader Skope firm-specified division 
  3. Position Description: Process Leader (worker) Skope firm-specified division 
*4. Incentive Memorandum   Skope Custom 
*5. Incentive Memo: Performance targets Skope firm-specified division 
  6. Skope Organization Chart  Skope intranet  
  7. Skope HR Manual Skope intranet  
*8. Skope Pay and Skill Matrix Skope firm-specified and Custom 
*9. Variation to Employment Contract Skope Custom 
10. The Skope Cool Book Skope firm-specified division 
* Documents are confidential but a ‘disguised’ copy of these documents is available with the lead 
author. 
 
 
Table 3: Direct Observations and Informal Discussions 
 
 Duration 
(minutes) Activity Note 
1. 120 Manufacturing operations 1) Skope firm-specified division for 60 
minutes and 2) Skope Custom for about 
60 minutes 
2. 45 Informal discussions Plant manager: Understanding Cool Book 
3. 30 Informal discussions Firm-specified engineer: layout structure 
4. 60 Master scheduling process Operations manager: Firm-specified 
division. 
5. 45 Non-participant observation in 
customer order planning 
meeting 
Skope Custom:  Plant manager, Operation 
manager, Skope Custom headworker 
6. 60 Informal discussions Skope Custom headworker: Comparison 
of work with firm-specified division 
7. 45 Informal discussions Skope firm-specified division: Operations 
manager: Accident causes and Quality 
control problems: learning for future 
 
 
The process leader’s position description 
provides evidence. 
 
“Design and develop new refrigeration 
products and components and enhance 
existing refrigeration products and 
components;  participate in and coordinate 
your team’s efforts to ensure ‘established time 
frames’ and ‘specific customer requirements’ 
for each customer job are met.” 
[Position Description: Product development 
Title: Process Leader – Refrigeration Customs 
Key Responsibilities and Expected Outcomes] 
 
The phrases ‘established time frames’ and 
‘specific customer requirements’, correspond 
to the theoretical concepts of  the scheduled 
lead time in completing a job and adherence to 
specifications, respectively. These job-plan 
measures capture the overall team 
JAMAR      Vol. 13 · No. 1 2015 
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performance in the customer-specified 
division. Since individual performance is 
difficult to segregate in teamwork, the 
operations manager claims that the use of 
subjective indices (e.g., commitment and 
aptitude for challenges) helps ensure that 
individuals perform in line with the managers’ 
expectations.   
 
Though we could not find any direct evidence 
for the use of subjective performance measures 
in the workers’ position descriptions or other 
internal documents, our analysis suggests that 
Skope uses subjective measures in several 
informal contexts. For instance, when the 
customer-specified division was initially 
formed, a few workers who were in the firm-
specified division for a long time and 
acclaimed by peer-workers as inspiring and 
challenge-seeking mates were ‘hand-picked’ 
for the new customer-specified division. 
However over time, for subsequent 
appointments to the new division, the 
operations manager depends on feedback from 
Skope HR advisor’s general appraisal of 
individual workers carried out each year.   
 
The HR appraisals are carried out in two 
stages: first, a self-assessment survey, which 
mainly consists of individual workers’ open-
ended explanations of specific instances of 
learning and unlearning experienced during 
the year.  Second, using such surveys as the 
basis, the HR advisor (and few of her trained 
staff) conduct interviews with the workers to 
identify their specific traits and match it 
against their current pay-scales. Though we 
were not part of such interviews (due to 
privacy law restrictions) to observe how the 
HR staff extract relevant aptitude-related 
information from the interviewees, the HR 
advisor admits of her ability (due to skill and 
experience) to build on-the spot cross-
questions and assess the veracity of the 
interviewee responses. Thereafter, she refers to 
the pay and skills matrix (item 8; Table 2), 
which matches required skills with salary 
increments to determine their future pay-
scales.   
 
We now move to the choice of measures used 
for determining rewards. The internal memo 
on incentives issued to the customer-specified 
division’s process leader provides evidence.   
 
“You are offered the opportunity to participate 
in an incentive based on the number of 
refrigeration custom cabinets produced in the 
customs area. For the current financial year, 
you will be paid $x (actual amount concealed 
upon firm’s request) gross for the first 
significantly unique prototype cabinet 
produced and $x-20 gross for each cabinet 
produced thereafter (implying repeating a 
customer-specified order for the same 
customer in the next period)…Signed…” 
 
[Incentive Memo. Customs Refrigeration 
Department] 
 
Note that the memo does not mention the 
evaluation measures of ADSPEC and DETIME 
but instead refers to a totally different measure 
namely, the number of new prototypes 
(NUMPRO).  The concern is whether 
achieving the targets under NUMPRO would 
enhance ADSPEC and DETIME.  Further, 
questions arise as to why the firm bases its 
rewards on NUMPRO, instead of the job-
specific measures.  
 
Theoretically, NUMPRO a period-based 
measure, may not correspond with the job-
specific measures of ADSPEC and DETIME 
and the individual-based subjective indices. 
Though the incentive contract contains a 
protective clause which states that “Skope 
retains the right to reverse the payment, if 
deemed appropriate”, the central question as to 
why there is a mismatch in the design of its 
performance and compensation measures, still 
remains valid.    
 
Data Verification 
 
Prior to moving to theoretical analysis, we 
seek to rule out chances that this observation 
could have been a mistake or a mere random 
occurrence.  We first verify whether any 
detailed (instead of overall job or period-based 
measures) measure (e.g., labour hours 
expended on a task) is relevant for the 
customer-specified division.  The purpose is to 
gain conviction that the choice of overall 
measures used in the customer-specified 
division is not because of inadequate planning 
but more of a deliberate choice.  According to 
the operations manager:  
 
 “Specific measures (e.g., task standards) are 
totally irrelevant.  If a task standard (e.g., 
number of units made) is a measure you put on 
them (customer-specified division workers), 
then they might look at a job or enquiry (and 
JAMAR      Vol. 13 · No. 1 2015 
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decide) that it is too much work and take only 
the easy ones (an example of opportunism). So 
suddenly, we will end up with a whole lot of 
components (for different orders) and we will 
not meet the customer needs (relating to lead 
time for any job).” 
 
Next, we examine the choice of measures for 
evaluation and incentives in the firm-specified 
division.  The objective is that if the 
neighbouring division within the same firm 
adopts a consistent set of measures for both 
evaluation and reward, then there is a greater 
reason to believe that the observed mismatch 
in the customer-specified division is a 
deliberate design and not just a random 
occurrence.   
 
For the firm-specified division, the operations 
manager and the plant general manager refer 
to three performance areas namely, safety, 
quality and productivity. Specific measures are 
developed for each area.  Safety is evaluated 
for the overall plant through a quantitative 
measure, ‘lost time injuries’ (LTI). This 
measure captures the number of times in a 
month that the factory work was disrupted 
because of an injury.   Quality is assessed with 
a single financial measure, cost of quality 
(CoQ), which is defined as manufacturing 
costs incurred that cannot be recovered due to 
wastage.  As wastage in any process is 
‘treated’ before transferring it to a succeeding 
process, each process is held accountable only 
for its own performance in terms of wasted 
units. While safety is a plant-wide measure, 
quality is a process department-based measure.   
 
For productivity, the operations manager relies 
on measures such as units produced (e.g., 
number of folds per day) or hours utilized 
(e.g., compressor assembly) to capture 
individual workers’ task efficiencies against 
pre-determined standards. The following 
internal memo on rewards issued to process 
leaders by the operations manager gives 
examples of the task standards.  
 
“The lost time injuries (LTIs) (with a weight of 
30%) must not exceed 12 (per annum July to 
June); cost of quality with a weight of 20% 
must not exceed $x (July to June) (amount 
concealed to protect privacy); productivity 
(with a weight of 50%) must be at least 74% in 
terms of standard to actual hours (July to 
June.  Signed…”  
 
[Incentive Memo. Extract from Paragraph 4: 
Performance targets] 
 
The targets for the measures under safety, 
quality and productivity are planned at the 
beginning of the year. The safety target is for 
the entire plant to sustain no more than a 
specified number of LTIs (currently 12) in a 
year.  
 
For CoQ, a plant-wide target is allocated to the 
individual processes based on the proportion 
of value-added at each stage. The productivity 
(efficiency measures) target is based on 
individual performance in terms of units 
produced or time taken. The target measures of 
safety, quality and productivity are then 
assigned relative weights.  
 
To motivate workers, the firm-specified 
division offers a matching reward scheme, 
which compensates the actual performance on 
safety, quality and productivity relative to the 
targets. The actual scores get altered if the 
targets are not reached. For instance, if the 
weight for safety is 30 percent, the division 
loses a safety score of 3 percent for every 
single additional actual LTIs beyond the limit. 
 
In summary, the evidence from the firm-
specified division regarding the measures used 
for evaluation is consistent with the measures 
used for providing incentives.  Given this 
trend, there is reason to believe that the 
mismatching measures chosen for the 
customer-specified division is a deliberate 
design and that Skope must have had some 
defensible reasons for such a design choice.   
 
Theoretical Analysis of the Findings 
 
Mismatching Measures for Performance 
and Reward 
 
At the operational level, where workers act as 
agents for the principal managers, the interests 
of workers are likely to be more closely 
aligned with the managers’ expectations if the 
measures used for evaluation of workers’ 
performance are consistent with the measures 
identified for rewards (Wruck and Jensen, 
1994).  
 
In Skope, the operations manager argues that 
offering incentives for customer-specified 
division on a single measure NUMPRO is a 
JAMAR      Vol. 13 · No. 1 2015 
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cost-efficient surrogate since it is a single, 
periodic measure that captures the effects of 
two separate evaluation measures ADSPEC 
and DETIME of each job.  The cost efficiency 
argument is based on the manager’s belief that 
NUMPRO is likely to increase with 
improvements in ADSPEC and DETIME for 
each job.  We have two main concerns here:  
First, no direct physical evidence was 
available in support of this belief statement.  
Second, in theory, the belief statement may not 
always hold.  For instance, a team may obtain 
a new project but still not care to achieve the 
two job-specific measures in carrying out the 
project.  If the project is from a one-off 
customer, then the chances of getting another 
order from a different customer may not be 
affected, at least in the short run!  
 
Despite our concerns, our interviews with 
several senior managers reveal full support for 
the choice of measures used in the customer-
specified division. We therefore proceed to 
identify the organisational factors that 
individually and collectively provide evidence-
based rationale to the apparent mismatch 
among the three stated measures and the role 
of subjective indices in the customer-specified 
division. To minimise the chances of omitting 
key explanatory variables, we follow the 
procedures beginning from customer order 
processing up until project completion. 
 
The Information-Hiding Problem and 
Solution 
 
Recall that when a new customer order is 
received, the plant general manager joins with 
the operations manager and the process leader 
to determine the feasibility of making that 
order.  A joint decision by the principal and 
the agent is efficient when different 
individuals hold different pieces of specialised 
knowledge (Jensen and Meckling, 1992; 
Milne, 2007; Du Plessis, 2007).  According to 
the plant general manager: 
  
“Deciding if a new custom order is 
manufacturable (initiation and planning of 
design) is very much a combined decision.  
While we focus on whether the new order 
matches Skope’s strategic priorities, the 
process leader and his team examine if the 
order or the project is doable.”  
 
If the project is accepted, detailed planning is 
carried out by the process leader and his team 
and presented for approval prior to execution.  
The operations manager admits: 
 
“To be honest, I usually only check (due to 
specialised knowledge) whether the plan 
sounds logical.  I throw in a question or two 
(such as) ‘have you considered using flexible 
manufacturing systems to do this’ or ‘could 
the welding bay help (in achieving customer 
specifications)’.  Generally he (the process 
leader) has a solution too. Once we agree on 
the design, then executing the tasks is done 
very much by the process leader and his 
team.”  
 
As the work gets executed, the manager uses 
ADSPEC and DETIME to assess the team’s 
performance.  Though Skope initially used the 
same measures even for rewards, the feedback 
provided by Skope’s prestigious customer, 
Coca-Cola, in the customer satisfaction 
register drastically changed Skope’s strategy.  
The feedback revealed that though ADSPEC 
and DETIME were achieved for their order, 
Skope could have exercised greater influence 
over its employees to exploit further 
opportunities available to them (both in skills 
and technology) to improve the option features 
and innovativeness of the refrigerator models 
that Coca-Cola had initially designed. The 
plant general manager says: 
 
“Coca-Cola is a truly important customer that 
we cannot afford to lose… If they are not 
satisfied, then we have to re-think on what to 
evaluate (in terms of performance) and in 
particular how to motivate the workers to 
share their further-innovation ideas to 
improve the product beyond what is initially 
agreed with the customers.” 
 
The feedback from Coca-Cola and the general 
manager’s statement both indicate the 
potential for workers’ opportunistic behaviour 
in that they may merely carry out what is 
agreed initially in the ADSPEC and DETIME 
and not reveal their ideas for any further-
innovation.  This is because, apart from not 
gaining any additional value out of such 
disclosures, they may even lose their reward if 
the initially agreed ADSPEC and DETIME are 
not achieved.  
 
Though Skope managers generally enjoy 
healthy relations with workers, the human 
relations (HR) policy statement states that 
Skope does not want to create control systems 
JAMAR      Vol. 13 · No. 1 2015 
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that even remotely encourage a worker to 
indulge in opportunism.  According to the 
operations manager: 
 
“At the moment, he (process leader) meets me 
daily, I get him to give me an update of what 
his team is working on, and to specify how the 
team is getting on… and a lot of it is based on 
trust in them… I (still) would not want a 
performance measurement system that can 
encourage, even if it is remote, opportunistic 
behaviour in my workers.” 
 
In response to the need for motivating the 
workers to reveal further-innovation potential, 
the plant general manager, in consultation with 
the operations manager, makes a decision to 
remove ADSPEC and DETIME as measures 
for incentive compensation.  Consistent with 
economic theory (Brickley et al. 2009), 
removing incentives for concealing innovation 
ideas does not ensure automatic revelation of 
the ideas in our field study.  We find evidence 
in Skope’s organisational policies and 
practices that create implicit incentives for not 
only carrying out and sharing further research 
ideas.  The operations manager insists: 
 
“We only put people [in the customer-
specified division] who have the initiative: 
think on their feet, share new information and 
undertake challenging tasks.  This is very 
different to the rest of the factory [the firm-
specified division] where the workers are 
expected to follow prescribed standards”.   
 
Further documentary evidence is as follows.  
  
“The process leader is responsible for 
Refrigeration Customs’ construction, assembly 
and testing of prototypes (models) for custom 
orders and sales.  The process leader will also 
assist in the design of prototypes.  These 
responsibilities must be carried out in a 
positive and professional manner with 
willingness to undertake ‘challenging tasks’ 
and commitment to ‘continuous improvement’ 
and ‘quality processes’ at all times.” 
 
[Position Description: Objectives 
Title: Process Leader – Refrigeration Customs 
Reports to:  Operations Manager – 
Refrigeration] 
 
With the above evidence sources, we build the 
initial blocks of the theory as follows.  
Together with the removal of the two job-
specific measures for incentives, a recruitment 
policy that focuses on commitment and 
aptitude for challenges helps create the desired 
incentive for workers to engage in further-
innovation. 
   
The “Go-Slow” Problem and Solution 
 
Agency theory claims that the downside in 
creating incentives for a specific innovation 
activity is that the activity may be pursued 
even to the extent of detriment to firm’s long-
term interests unless the firm implements 
efficient mechanisms for innovation control 
(Klein and Sorra, 1996).  The basic argument 
is that the creation of incentives for harnessing 
agents’ expertise combines the need for 
delegation of rights with agents’ ability to 
generate informational rents, which in turn, 
gives rise to the agents’ scope for opportunism 
indulgence (Jensen and Meckling, 1992; Du 
Plessis, 2007).  In our context, examples of 
agents’ opportunism include deliberate delays 
or ‘go-slow’ attitudes in building a new 
prototype. According to the operations 
manager: 
 
“…if we motivate the workers (in customer-
specified division) to go ahead and innovate 
further, then they get focused on it consciously 
or subconsciously.  Then they might look at a 
job and (decide to) take the easy way and work 
at their own pace (an example of 
opportunism). We do not have all the time in 
the world... (Otherwise), we will end up facing 
a whole lot of totally dissatisfied customers.”   
 
Given the need to balance between meeting 
customer requirements and also suggesting 
further-innovation in an environment that 
offers scope for opportunistic delays, how to 
evaluate the customer-specified division 
workers’ performance is a concern that many 
Skope managers commonly share.  The 
operations manager states: 
 
“I have been discussing (with the plant 
general manager) on how to evaluate their 
(Skope Custom workers’) performance.  It is 
difficult… You can’t really say you have got to 
do 20 (refrigerators) next month, because 
sometimes they tell you that even a single 
order can take two weeks… They (customer-
specified workers) have got the experience and 
knowledge that I will never have…” 
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The concern for reducing delays and the 
strategy for offering innovative products in the 
customer-specified division is shared by the 
managing director as follows. 
 
“Though ‘quality, innovation and customer 
satisfaction’ are our key strengths, we do face 
competitive pressures from local 
manufacturers who deliver refrigerators 
cheaper and faster.  We, therefore, have 
decided to reduce our lead time even while 
continuously developing innovative products. 
Our competitive strategy is to combine our key 
strengths with ‘shorter’ lead times”. 
 
Further evidence from a policy statement is as 
follows. 
 
“(In customer-specified division,) Skope will 
produce innovative cost-effective design that 
satisfies customers’ design brief, ‘on time’.” 
 
[Quality Standard -Design Policy Statement: 
PL002.3] 
 
Given the pressures to reduce lead time in 
innovating for customised products, we argue 
that the operations manager in and the plant 
general manager are forced to adopt the 
period-based measure, NUMPRO, whose 
objective is to promote speedy innovation.  
The indirect expectation is that the measure 
reduces incentives for opportunistic delays. 
For the customer-specified division, the effect 
of all these changes in the choice of measures 
is the apparent mismatch between the 
evaluation measures (ADSPEC and DETIME) 
and the incentive measure (NUMPRO).   
 
Our study suggests that though Skope 
managers are conscious of the effects of such 
mismatch, they are reluctant to dispense with 
the two evaluation measures ADSPEC and 
DETIME because these represent job-specific 
measures that can yield customer satisfaction 
in case the workers identify that no further-
innovation is possible for any particular job 
without incurring substantial costs.  This 
difficulty is expressed by the operations 
manager thus: 
 
“It is difficult… (For customer-specified 
division), to come up with a formula to 
measure job performance, and simultaneously 
motivate innovation and penalise delays, you 
would need a rocket scientist.”  
 
The Economic Role of Subjective Measures  
  
Due to the deliberate inconsistent design at 
Skope, a further analysis reveals evidence for 
the judicious use of subjective measures that 
provides a practical solution to the mismatch 
problem in Skope.  At the first level, the 
opportunistic scope for the hiding of 
information can be reduced with the removal 
of incentives for ADSPEC and DETIME.  
However, what motivates the workers to 
disclose and engage in further-innovation, 
which can be critical to increase customer 
satisfaction?  This is where Skope’s careful 
selection and retention policy applies.  It 
ensures that workers who are intrinsically 
committed and willing to accept challenges are 
allocated to the customer-specified division, 
even though there is no formal periodic 
evaluation or reward that is linked to the 
subjective measure of commitment and 
aptitude for challenges.   
 
At the second level, the tendency to protract 
innovation can be controlled by introducing a 
new measure, NUMPRO upon which 
incentives are based.  However, what could 
still motivate the workers to continue to 
achieve ADSPEC and DETIME, when these 
measures are not linked to rewards?  This is 
where the Skope customer satisfaction register 
plays an important role.  Herein, the customers 
can record any feedback, including criticisms, 
on any specific job.  This register is accessible 
to all employees in the firm and further it is 
possible to identify the members who were 
involved in any specific job.  Agency theory 
predicts that when a feedback mechanism is 
accessible to the principal and other agents, it 
can trigger a reputation threat for the specific 
agent on whom the feedback is directed 
(Fama, 1980; Storey and Barnett, 2000).  To 
protect their reputation, we argue that the 
workers seek to continually monitor their 
ADSPEC and DETIME progress on each job 
until such time they identify avenues for 
further-innovation, which are agreeable to the 
customer.   
 
One may inquire why the two subjective 
indices are not formally included as evaluation 
or incentive measures, particularly when they 
play a critical role in linking mismatching set 
of measures for evaluation and incentives. 
Evidence suggests that formalizing subjective 
performance measures is costly due to lack of 
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transparency and assessment difficulty.  The 
operations manager concludes: 
 
“The whole area of performance measurement 
and monitoring … we are developing it, but we 
are trying to target objective standards that 
can be easily assessed rather than mere 
subjective (measures)… (However,) I have 
come to realise that subjective side of 
measures suits well here (in customer-
specified division).  So where needed, we may 
use them, but only to the extent needed.” 
 
Further, since the register’s presence itself 
offers a credible threat against violating the 
evaluation measures, the non-inclusion of 
customer satisfaction as a formal measure is 
not critical. The following Figure 1 
summarizes the whole theoretical logic 
mentioned in this section. 
 
Figure 1: Sources of Opportunism 
  
Is the new 
project feasible? 
Potential for concealing 
new information 
Fix ADSPEC and DETIME as 
measures for evaluation and 
incentives 
How is the project 
plan? 
Project declined or 
withdrawn 
Is the project 
executed according 
to plan? 
Is the customer happy with 
project outcome? 
Has the worker identified 
scope for further 
innovation? 
Project  
Completed Remove incentives for 
ADSPEC and 
START 
To understand when and why measures of 
evaluation and incentives do not match 
and how firms manage the mismatch 
 
YES 
NO 
YES 
NO
YES 
NO 
Continues below 
YES 
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Incentives created 
for further 
innovation 
Further 
innovation 
Potential for 
delaying 
Install incentives for the number 
of new projects developed 
Incentive created 
for not delaying 
Mismatch in measures 
used between evaluation 
and incentives 
Key control: The allocated 
incentives are disbursed only 
based on customer satisfaction 
record
END 
Measures are deliberately kept 
different when potential for concealing 
and delaying are likely to exist and 
subjective customer satisfaction 
measure along with implicit incentives 
resolves the mismatch 
 
Create organisational climate for 
implicit incentives 
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Conclusions and Limitations 
 
In summary, evidence suggests that the need to 
manage two conflicting goals namely, meeting 
customer requirements and at the same time 
motivating workers to engage in further 
innovation generates scope for potential 
sources of opportunism namely, hiding 
information on further-innovation avenues and 
protracting innovation (go-slow).  To control 
the problems, Skope uses mismatching 
measures for performance evaluation and 
reward.  While the potential to hide 
information is resolved by (1) removing 
ADSPEC and DETIME as measures for 
incentives, motivation for further-innovation is 
achieved by (2) selecting workers with 
commitment and challenge aptitude.  The 
potential to protract innovation is resolved by 
introducing a new objective measure namely 
NUMPRO.  The resulting mismatch between 
the evaluation and incentive measures is 
bridged by the use of a subjective measure 
namely, customer satisfaction.   
 
However, the theoretical development must be 
interpreted in the light of some potential 
limitations.  Our field study is based on one 
firm, Skope Industries. Though we adopt Yin’s 
(1994) systematic approaches to scientific 
field study inquiry, our study lacks the 
advantage of having two or more firms, which 
can enhance the replicative power of our 
explanations. However, based on what Yin 
(1994) suggests as a theoretical replication, 
our approach to obtain contrasting evidence 
from the other division within the same firm 
having a dissimilar customisation strategy 
offers triangulation that builds credibility to 
our findings.  Further, almost all interview 
data, is corroborated by archival records and 
direct observations.   
 
Finally, several future directions arise in this 
line of research.  Future studies can develop 
hypotheses on the two specific sources of 
opportunism and empirically test the same 
with large samples.  Furthermore, need exists 
to understand the theoretical determinants of 
measurement mismatch (Ittner and Larcker, 
2002), which will help advance our knowledge 
as to when and under what circumstances 
mismatch may be a preferred option.  Another 
area where our understanding is still primitive 
is the relation between consistency and 
subjective measures. What is their role in 
achieving goal congruence?  Would the 
decision to formalize subjective measures 
moderate the achievement of goal congruence?   
In any case, we believe that the area of 
consistency in the choice of measures 
promises to offer several avenues for future 
research.   
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